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1 Introduction
A well known paradox in international trade theory is the so-called transfer
paradox (cf. Leontief (1936)). This paradox is said to occur if some country
donates some of its resources to some other country and yet the donor benefits
while the recipient is worse off. The transfer paradox is important for example
to understand the widening gap between the gross national product of less
and of highly developed countries. According to this view foreign aid may
be the reason for the disadvantageous development of the recipient country.
A well known paradox in financial economics is the so-called sunspot para-
dox. This paradox is said to occur if some exogenous event has no direct
influence on the economic fundamentals and yet the endogenous equilibrium
allocation depends on it. Sunspot equilibria are important for example to un-
derstand the phenomenon of self-fulfilling expectations which is an essential
feature of financial markets.
At first sight these two paradoxes seem unrelated. The transfer paradox
concerns comparative statics with respect to endowment redistributions while
the sunspot paradox is a property of competitive equilibria in some given
economy. The idea that these paradoxes may be related arises from the
observation that both can result from the multiplicity of equilibria. However,
multiplicity of equilibria is a sufficient but not a necessary condition for the
paradoxes to occur and it would be useful to establish actual equivalence as
this would allow the two strands of literature to be combined. The purpose of
this note is to show that for a specific class of economies these two paradoxes
are indeed equivalent. Hence, this note provides a link between two strands
of the literature which have so far been developed in isolation.
The class of economies we consider are economies with two agents (resp.
two countries) whose utility functions are concave transformations of ad-
ditively separable functions. The case of two countries is the canonical
international trade model and additive separability of utility functions is
a commonly used assumption in applied general equilibrium theory. Ap-
plications of the general equilibrium model are usually done for a class of
economies with a simple enough structure so that excess demand functions
remain manageable. Computable general equilibrium models (cf. Shoven and
Whalley (1992)), examples for the occurrence of the transfer paradox (Leon-
tief (1936), Chichilniski (1980), Chichilniski (1983), Rao (1992), Geanakoplos
and Heal (1983), etc), and examples for multiple equilibria (Kehoe (1985),
Kehoe (1991), Hens, Schmedders and Voß (1999), Hens, Laitenberger and
Lo¨ﬄer (2002)) therefore use the class of CES-utility functions. The class of
utility functions assumed in this paper (concave transformations of additively
separable functions) includes CES-functions. For this class of economies we
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show that across competitive equilibria higher levels of utility are associ-
ated with lower marginal utility. This property is important to establish the
equivalence between the two paradoxes.
To get the intuition for our result note that a sunspot equilibrium consists
of a set of spot market equilibria (one for each sunspot state) where the
endowments of each spot market economy are obtained from redistributions
resulting from the equilibrium asset market allocation. Hence an unfavorable
redistribution of endowments as it occurs exogenously in the transfer paradox
can be derived from asset trade only if the agent who expects a utility loss
from the transfer also sees a chance of a utility gain in some other sunspot
state. In the asset market equilibrium the sum across states (adjusted by
the common probability beliefs) of the products of marginal utilities and
wealth transfers has to be equal for both agents. The above mentioned
property then allows to order marginal utilities inversely to utility levels and
by the transfer paradox the order of wealth transfers does not coincide with
the order of utility levels. Hence by an appropriate choice of the agents’
degree of risk aversion both agents’ first order conditions can be satisfied at
nontrivial levels of asset trade which in turn implies that allocations differ
across sunspot states. The converse of this statement is also true: If there are
non-trivial sunspot equilibria, then the order crossing property just described
has to hold, i.e. the transfer paradox occurs. Of course, a rigorous argument
for this intuition will be given once we have made precise the setup of the
model considered.
As an application of the equivalence between the transfer paradox and
the sunspot paradox we show that the occurrence of sunspot equilibria is
subject to the same critique as the occurrence of the transfer paradox. In
a model with two commodities in each country, sunspot equilibria can only
occur if the initial equilibrium (the equilibrium without asset trade) is not
unique. Moreover, if as in the case of Cobb-Douglas economies, uniqueness
of equilibria is guaranteed for almost all distributions of endowments then
sunspot equilibria cannot occur at all. Then we show, using the equivalence
between the two paradoxes, that nevertheless the occurrence of sunspot equi-
libria does not need to be based on the exogenous selection among multiple
equilibria. We construct a simple example in which the equilibrium of any
sunspot state is not an equilibrium of any other sunspot state. This example
is based on the idea that financial markets may specify incomplete insurance
against the uncertainty that they induce. That is to say, in this example
asset payoffs are sunspot-dependent and incomplete.
This example further clarifies the relation of the existence of sunspot
equilibria and the uniqueness of spot market equilibria. This question has
also been addressed by Mas-Colell (1992) and Gottardi and Kajii (1999), for
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example. The result in this section extends the results of Mas-Colell (1992)
to a stronger notion of uniqueness of spot market equilibria. As a by-product
it clarifies a confusion that has recently come up in Hens (2000) and Barnett
and Fisher (2002). Note also that the result of Gottardi and Kajii (1999) does
not apply to our model because it relies on first period consumption. With
first period consumption asset trade may occur because of intertemporal
substitution and as a by-product this may introduce extrinsic uncertainty as
Cass (1989) has first pointed out. Also for the same reason the technique
developed by Gottardi and Kajii (1999) is not applicable here because they
control the agents’ utility gradients both by perturbing the utility functions
and by changing the level of first-period consumption.
In the next section we outline the model and give the definitions of the
transfer paradox and of sunspot equilibria. Thereafter we prove our main
result establishing the equivalence of the transfer paradox and the occurrence
of sunspot equilibria. Section 4 applies this result to derive some new insights
both for sunspot equilibria and also for the transfer paradox. Section 5
concludes.
2 Model
We first outline the sunspot model. The transfer paradox will then be em-
bedded in the sunspot model by a new interpretation of the sunspot states.
There are two periods. In the second period, one of s = 1, . . . , S, states
of the world occurs. In the first period assets are traded. Consumption
only takes place in the second period. This assumption is important here be-
cause otherwise the sunspot model cannot be linked to the atemporal transfer
paradox model. There are l = 1, . . . , L, commodities in each state. Since our
results hold for the case of two agents, even though it is not necessary for the
general definitions, we will outright restrict attention to two agents i = 1, 2.
States are called sunspot states because the agents’ characteristics within
the states, i.e. the agents’ endowments ωi ∈ X i and their utility functions
ui : X i → IR, do not depend on them. X i is a closed convex subset of
IRL+ which denotes agent i’s consumption set. In the sunspot literature the
agents’ characteristics [(ui, ωi)i=1,2.] are called the economic fundamentals.
Throughout this note we make the
Assumption 1 (Additive Separability) Both agents’ von Neumann-Mor-
genstern utility functions ui are additively separable, i.e. ui(xi1, . . . , x
i
L) =∑L
l=1 g
i
l(x
i
l) for all x
i ∈ X i, where the functions gil , l = 1, . . . , L, are assumed
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to be twice continuously differentiable, strictly increasing and concave. More-
over, we assume that for every agent i at least L− 1 of the functions gil are
strictly concave and that for all commodities l there is some i for which gil is
strictly concave.
Note that the assumptions on the functions gil guarantee strict quasi-
concavity of the function ui. The class of utility functions covered by this as-
sumption is quite large and it includes all utility functions that are commonly
used in applied general equilibrium theory. In particular, the case of CES util-
ities defined for all i = 1, ..., I on X i = {x ∈ IRL++|u
i(x) ≥ ui(ωi)}, for some
ωi ∈ IRL++, is covered by these assumptions, since then g
i
l(x
i
l) = (α
i
l)
1−ρi(xil)
ρi
for some 0 < αil < 1, l = 1, . . . , L and some ρ
i < 1.
Moreover we assume that
Assumption 2 (Expected Utility) For both agents, i = 1, 2, the ex-
pected utility functions, defining preferences over state contingent consump-
tion xi(s) ∈ IRL, s = 1, ..., S are given by
U i(xi(1), . . . , xi(S)) =
S∑
s=1
pi(s)hi(ui(xi(s))) ∀xi ∈ (X i)S,
where the hi are twice continuously differentiable, strictly increasing and
strictly concave functions.
Hence what matters for agents’ asset demand is the composition hi ◦ ui,
which are concave transformations of additively separable functions. Note
that Assumptions 1 and 2 together are sufficient to guarantee strict quasi-
concavity of the function U i. In the first period agents can trade j = 1, . . . , J ,
real assets with payoffs Aj(s) ∈ IRL if state s occurs. We denote asset prices
by q ∈ IRJ . Agent i’s portfolio of assets is denoted by θi ∈ IRJ . All equilibria
we consider in this setting are special cases of competitive equilibria, which
are defined in
Definition 1 (Competitive Equilibrium) A competitive equilibrium is an
allocation (
∗
x
i
,
∗
θ
i
),i=1,2, and a price system (
∗
p,
∗
q) such that
1. For both agents i = 1, 2: (
∗
x
i
,
∗
θ
i
) ∈ a rgmaxxi∈Xi,θi∈IRJ
∑S
s=1 pi(s)h
i(ui(xi(s)))
s.t.
∗
q · θi ≤ 0,
∗
p(s) · xi(s) ≤
∗
p(s) · ωi +
∗
p(s) ·A(s)θi for all s = 1, . . . , S.
2.
∗
x
1
(s) +
∗
x
2
(s) = ω1 + ω2 for all s = 1, . . . , S.
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3.
∗
θ
1
+
∗
θ
2
= 0.
Remark 1 To simplify the exposition when analyzing competitive equilib-
rium allocations and Pareto-efficient allocations we restrict attention to in-
terior allocations, i.e. to allocations xi in the interior of X i, i=1,2. A
sufficient assumption guaranteeing the interiority of allocations is to impose
that the functions hi and gil satisfy the Inada condition according to which
the marginal utility tends to infinity at the boundary of the consumption set
X i ⊂ IRL+.
Note that a competitive equilibrium consists of S spot market equilibria
(one for each spot market economy with endowments ωˆi(s) = ωi + A(s)θi )
together with an asset market equilibrium by which the ex-post endowments
of the spot markets are generated. Finally, note that when showing the
existence of sunspot equilibria we allow to choose the characteristics not
fixed by the economic fundamentals, the sunspot extension, appropriately.
The sunspot extension consist of the probabilities of the sunspot states pi,
the asset structure A and also the risk aversion functions hi. The sunspot
equilibria are robust with respect to perturbations of these characteristics
however sunspot equilibria will not exist for all possible choices of the sunspot
extension.
It will be convenient to introduce the spot-market economy of the eco-
nomic fundamentals as a point of reference. To abbreviate notations we
therefore let this economy be the spot market economy in the spot s = 0.
In the sunspot literature agents transfer commodity bundles across sunspot
states by trading assets. In the international trade literature one thinks of
transfers of commodities arising from donations. Each sunspot state can
then be associated with different such donations. The transfer paradox is
said to occur if some agent donates some of his resources to the other agent
and yet the donor’s utility increases while the recipients utility decreases. In
this statement the utility comparison is done across the competitive equi-
libria of the economy before and after the donation. In the standard case
of the transfer paradox, the transfer was considered to be a transfer of a
non-negative amount of commodities (Leontief (1936)). In order to make
the equivalence to the sunspot model more obvious we consider a slightly
more general definition of the transfer paradox which only requires that the
donated commodities have non-negative value in the competitive equilibrium
after the transfer. As Geanakoplos and Heal (1983) have already shown this
generalization is innocuous.
In the following definition we consider alternative possible transfers ∆ω(z)
that we index by some scenarios z. When relating the transfer paradox to
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sunspot equilibria these scenarios will be associated with different states of
the world, z = 1, ..., S. Taking care of potentially multiple equilibria the
transfer paradox is then defined as in
Definition 2 (Transfer Paradox) Given an economy with fundamentals
[(ui, ωi)i=1,2] the transfer paradox occurs if and only if there exists some
transfer of endowments (from agent 2 to agent 1), ∆ω(z), such that for
the economy [u1, u2, ω1 + ∆ω(z), ω2 − ∆ω(z)] there exists an equilibrium
(
∗
x
1
(z),
∗
x
2
(z),
∗
p(z)) with
∗
p(z)·∆ω(z) ≥ 0 so that u1(
∗
x
1
(z)) < u1(
∗
x
1
(0)) for some
equilibrium (
∗
x
1
(0),
∗
x
2
(0),
∗
p(0)) of the economic fundamentals,[(ui, ωi)i=1,2], in
the reference scenario without transfers, s = 0.
Note that if the economic fundamentals have at least two equilibria then
even without any transfers the transfer paradox occurs. Our definition covers
this case because then ∆ω = 0 is already sufficient to obtain u1(
∗
x
1
(z)) <
u1(
∗
x
1
(0)) for the two equilibria s = 0, z. Of course if the resulting equilibria
are regular then in this case one can also find some transfers of endowments
that have positive value and yet the recipients utility decreases. Making the
transfer paradox a bit more paradoxical.
We will show that the occurrence of the transfer paradox is a necessary
condition for sunspots to matter. To show a converse of this claim we consider
the following slightly stronger notion of the transfer paradox.
Definition 3 (Strong Transfer Paradox) Given an economy with fun-
damentals [(ui, ωi)i=1,2] the strong transfer paradox occurs if and only if there
exist some transfers of endowments (from agent 2 to agent 1), ∆ω(z) and
∆ω(s˜) such that for the economies [u1, u2, ω1 + ∆ω(s), ω2 −∆ω(s)], s = z, s˜
1. there are some equilibria (
∗
x
1
(z),
∗
x
2
(z),
∗
p(z)),(
∗
x
1
(s˜),
∗
x
2
(s˜),
∗
p(s˜)) with
∗
p(z)·
∆ω(z) ≥ 0 and
∗
p(s˜) ·∆ω(s˜) ≤ 0 and
2. it holds that u1(
∗
x
1
(z)) < u1(
∗
x
1
(s˜)) < u1(
∗
x
1
(0)) for some equilibrium
(
∗
x
1
(0),
∗
x
2
(0),
∗
p(0)) of the economic fundamentals [(ui, ωi)i=1,2], in the
reference scenario without transfers s = 0.
Note, that if the economic fundamentals have at least three equilibria then
by the same reason as given for the transfer paradox the strong transfer para-
dox occurs. Hence the existence of at least (three) two equilibria is sufficient
for the (strong) transfer paradox. Of course, in regular economies we know
that if there are at least two equilibria then there also are at least three
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equilibria (cf. Dierker (1972)). This observation indicates that in regular
economies the transfer paradox and the strong transfer paradox are actually
equivalent. Indeed this it true as the next proposition shows. Recall that in
regular economies equilibria are well determined, i.e. in a neighborhood of
regular equilibria (being defined by full rank of the Jacobian of market excess
demand) there exists a smooth mapping from the exogenous parameters of
the economy to the endogenous equilibrium values (cf. Debreu (1970)). In
the following argument regularity needs only be required for the spot market
equilibria of the economic fundamentals. This property holds generically in
the set of agents’ initial endowments X1 ×X2 (cf. Debreu (1970)).
Proposition 1 Suppose all spot market equilibria of the economic funda-
mentals [(ui, ωi)i=1,2] are regular. Then the transfer paradox and the strong
transfer paradox are equivalent.
Proof
The strong transfer paradox implies the transfer paradox. To establish
the converse suppose that the transfer paradox holds. I.e. there exists some
transfer of endowments (from agent 2 to agent 1), ∆ω(z), such that for
the economy [u1, u2, ω1 + ∆ω(z), ω2 − ∆ω(z)] there exists an equilibrium
(
∗
x
1
(z),
∗
x
2
(z),
∗
p(z)) with
∗
p(z) · ∆ω(z) ≥ 0 so that u1(
∗
x
1
(z)) < u1(
∗
x
1
(0)) for
some equilibrium (
∗
x
1
(0),
∗
x
2
(0),
∗
p(0)) of the economic fundamentals, s = 0.
We need to show that there also exists some ∆ω(s˜) such that
∗
p(s˜)·∆ω(s˜) ≤
0 and u1(
∗
x
1
(z)) < u1(
∗
x
1
(s˜)) < u1(
∗
x
1
(0)). This is of course the intuitive case
in which a negatively valued transfer leads to a loss in utility. However, we
need to ensure that this is the outcome in the spot market equilibrium after
the transfer and that the utility loss is not too severe as compared to the loss
in the transfer paradox case. This is ensured by the regularity of the equi-
librium of the economic fundamentals from which we construct the transfer
appropriately: Consider the utility gradient of agent 1, ∇u1(
∗
x
1
(0)) at the
equilibrium of the economic fundamentals. Choose the transfers, (∆ω1(s˜))
such that ∇u1(
∗
x
1
(0))(∆ω1(s˜)) < 0. By the first order condition of utility
maximization in the reference situation s = 0 we get that this wealth trans-
fer evaluated at the pre-transfer prices is negative,
∗
p(0) · (∆ω(s˜)) < 0. Since
∇u1(
∗
x
1
(0))(∆ω(s˜)) < 0, by Proposition 31.2 (ii) in Magill and Quinzii (1996)
we can find some 1 ≥ α > 0 such that u1(
∗
x
1
(0) + α(∆ω(s˜))) < u1(
∗
x
1
(0)).
Moreover, by the regularity of the economy, α > 0 can be chosen small enough
so that also the utility at the induced equilibrium is smaller than in the ref-
erence situation without transfers, u1(
∗
x
1
(s˜)) < u1(
∗
x
1
(0)). This is because in
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regular economies the induced change in the equilibrium allocation
∗
x
1
(s˜) can
be held small so that | u1(
∗
x
1
(s˜))− u1(
∗
x
1
(0) + α∆ω(s˜)) | is also small. More-
over, by the same continuity argument this can be done such that ∆ω1(s˜)
evaluated at prices after the transfer is non-positive, i.e.
∗
p(s˜) · ∆ω1(s˜) ≤ 0.
Finally, all this can be done without decreasing the utility level too much, so
that for agent 1 we get the inequality u1(
∗
x
1
(z)) < u1(
∗
x
1
(s˜)) < u1(
∗
x
1
(0)). 
The strong transfer paradox ensures the order crossing property men-
tioned in the introduction. To see this note that it is always possible to
transfer resources from agent 2 to agent 1, say ∆ω(sˆ), such that the trans-
fer has negative value in the resulting equilibrium, i.e.
∗
p(sˆ) · ∆ω(sˆ) ≤ 0,
and agent 1 gets a level of utility that is smaller than any of the util-
ity levels considered in the definition of the strong transfer paradox, i.e.
u1(
∗
x
1
(sˆ)) < u1(
∗
x
1
(z)) < u1(
∗
x
1
(s˜)) < u1(
∗
x
1
(0)).1 By this observation we get
three transfers, two with negative value and one with positive value so that
the utility decreases for all transfers. As we will see, by Assumption 1 on the
economic fundamentals, we then get that the order of the marginal utilities
does not coincide with the order or the reverse order of the transfer values,
i.e. the order crossing property is obtained.
3 Main Result
In this section we show that under the maintained assumptions (two agents
with utility functions being concave transformations of additively separable
functions) the existence of sunspot equilibria is equivalent to the occurrence
of the transfer paradox.
To prepare for this result we first define the agents’ indirect utility func-
tion and their marginal utility of income within each state:
Let
vi(s) = vi(p(s), bi(s)) = max
xi∈Xi
L∑
l=1
gil(x
i
l(s)) s.t. p(s) · x
i(s) ≤ bi(s)
be the indirect utility of agents i in state s. Since the functions gil , l = 1, . . . , L
are concave and since at least L − 1 of them are strictly concave there is a
1Note that these losses in utility as compared to the equilibrium of the economic fun-
damentals do not conflict with the fact that trade is voluntary because it may be that the
utility of agent 1 derived from his initial endowments is even smaller than the expected
utility obtained in the spot market equilibria. Also the agent is assumed to be a price
taker, i.e. he cannot enforce the equilibrium of the economic fundamentals.
9
unique point xi at which the indirect utility attains its maximum, given that
for all commodities the prices pl(s), l = 1, . . . , L and the income b
i(s) are
positive. In our model the income bi(s) will be given by p(s) · (ωi +A(s) · θi).
I.e., the values of the transfers are given by ri(s) = p(s) · A(s) · θi. In the
analysis of the sunspot model the agents’ marginal utility of income will be
important
λi(s) = ∂vh
i(vi(s))∂bv
i(p(s), bi(s)).
Any competitive equilibrium induces an ordering of the agents’ utilities
across states, where by Pareto-efficiency the order of agent 1 is inverse to the
order of agent 2. The following lemma demonstrates that under Assumption
1 for both agents the order of the marginal utilities of income are inverse to
the order of their (indirect) utilities.
Lemma 1 Without loss of generality assume that in a competitive equilib-
rium
v1(1) ≤ v1(2) ≤ . . . ≤ v1(S).
Then under Assumption 1 it follows that
λ1(1) ≥ λ1(2) ≥ . . . ≥ λ1(S)
and that
λ2(1) ≤ λ2(2) ≤ . . . ≤ λ2(S).
Moreover, if v1(s˜) < v1(z) for some s˜, z ∈ {1, . . . , S} then the correspond-
ing inequality in the marginal utilities of income is also strict.
Proof
Assume that
v1(s˜) ≤ v1(z) (resp. that v1(s˜) < v1(z)) for some s˜, z ∈ {1, . . . , S}.
Then for some commodity, say k ∈ {l, . . . , L} we must have that
x1k(s˜) ≤ x
1
k(z) (resp. that x
1
k(s˜) < x
1
k(z)).
Moreover, Pareto-efficiency within spot markets implies that for all states
s = 1, . . . , S the marginal rates of substitution are equal across agents, i.e.
∂g1m(x
1
m(s))
∂g1l (x
1
l (s))
=
∂g2m(x
2
m(s))
∂g2l (x
2
l (s))
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for any pair of commodities (l,m). Note that x2m(s) = ω
1
m + ω
2
m − x
1
m(s),
s = 1, . . . , S. Hence if the functions gil are concave and if for some agent the
function gil is strictly concave then it follows that
x1l (s˜) ≤ x
1
l (z) (resp. that x
1
l (s˜) < x
1
l (z)) for all l = 1, . . . , L.
Without loss of generality assume that l = n is the numeraire in all states
s = 1, . . . , S, where n is chosen such that g1n is strictly concave. Hence we
have shown that
v1(1) ≤ v1(2) ≤ . . . ≤ v1(S) (with v1(s˜) < v1(z) for some s˜, z)
implies for the numeraire that
x1n(1) ≤ x
1
n(2) ≤ . . . ≤ x
1
n(S) (with x
1
n(s˜) < x
1
n(z) for some s˜, z).
From the first order condition to the maximization problem
max
xi∈Xi
u1(x1(s)) s.t. p(s) · x1(s) ≤ b1(s)
we get that ∂bv
1(p(s), b1(s)) = ∂g1n(x
1
n(s)) for all s = 1, . . . , S. Since h
1 and
g1n are strictly concave and since x
1
1(s) and v
1(s) are increasing (resp. strictly
increasing) in s we get that
λ1(1) ≥ λ1(2) ≥ . . . ≥ λ1(S) (resp. that λ1(z) > λ1(s˜)).
The claim for i = 2 follows analogously from the inverse inequalities
x2l (1) ≥ x
2
l (2) ≥ . . . ≥ x
2
l (S), for all l = 1, ..., L,
and from
v2(1) ≥ v2(2) ≥ . . . ≥ v2(S),
the latter inequalities being implied by Pareto-efficiency within spot markets.

This lemma puts us now in the position to prove the equivalence of the
occurrence of the transfer paradox and the existence of sunspot equilibria.
Theorem 1 (Main Result) Suppose both agents’ utility functions are con-
cave transformations of additively separable functions (Assumption 1 and
Assumption 2). Then
1. the transfer paradox is a necessary condition for sunspots to matter and
2. the strong transfer paradox is a sufficient condition for sunspots to mat-
ter.
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Proof
1. To link the transfer paradox to the sunspot economy consider
r(s) :=
∗
p(s) · A(s)
∗
θ1,
i.e. the transfer of income from agent 2 to agent 1 as generated by asset
trade in some competitive equilibrium.
A necessary condition for optimal portfolio choice is
S∑
s=1
λi(s)pi(s)r(s) = 0, i = 1, 2,
which we call the first-order conditions for asset demand.2
Without loss of generality assume that
v1(1) ≤ v1(2) ≤ . . . ≤ v1(S),
which by Pareto-efficiency within spot markets implies
v2(1) ≥ v2(2) ≥ . . . ≥ v2(S).
Now suppose, the transfer paradox does not occur. Then from the
observation made above it follows that the economic fundamentals must
have a unique equilibrium and for all states s = 1, . . . , S, r(s) ≥ 0 is
equivalent to v1(s) ≥ v1(0) and v2(s) ≤ v2(0). Accordingly r(s) ≤ 0 is
equivalent to v1(s) ≤ v1(0) and v2(s) ≥ v2(0). As above s = 0 is the
index of the reference economy given by the economic fundamentals.
Let s¯ be such that r(s) ≤ 0 for all s ≤ s¯ and r(s) ≥ 0 for all s > s¯,
then the first-order conditions for asset demand imply that
∑
s≤s¯
(λ1(s)− λ2(s))pi(s)|r(s)| =
∑
s>s¯
(λ1(s)− λ2(s))pi(s)|r(s)|.
The expected utility functions U i are invariant with respect to positive
affine transformations of the utility functions hi◦ui. Hence without loss
of generality we can choose the functions hi such that for the economy
in s¯ we have λi(s¯) = 1, for i = 1, 2.
2This condition follows from
∑
s
λi(s)pi(s)p(s)A(s) = γiq together with q ·θi = 0, i=1,2.
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Moreover, given this normalization, from the lemma proven above we
know that the differences (λ1(s) − λ2(s)) are non-negative for s ≤ s¯
and they are non-positive for s > s¯.
Hence, if sunspots did matter, then at least one of these differences
together with the corresponding r(s) has to be non-zero, which contra-
dicts the derived equality.
2. Suppose the strong transfer paradox occurs, then there exist transfers
indexed by s˜, z such that
r(z) ≥ 0, r(s˜) ≤ 0 and for some equilibria v1(z) < v1(s˜) < v1(0)
where v1(0) refers to agent 1’s utility in an equilibrium of the spot
economy s = 0.
Given the utility functions u1, u2 and given the total endowments ω1 +
ω2 consider the set of Pareto-efficient allocations as being parameterized
by the income transfers r.
Now we have to distinguish three cases:
Case 1: If r(z) > 0
then we know that b1(z) > 0 and therefore there exists r(sˆ) < 0 suffi-
ciently close to zero such that for the induced b1(sˆ) = (b1(z)+r(sˆ)) ≥ 0
we get v1(sˆ) < v1(z) for some equilibrium in sˆ. By this observation and
the strong transfer paradox we have the order crossing property:
r(sˆ) ≤ 0, r(s˜) ≤ 0, r(z) > 0
while
v1(sˆ) < v1(z) < v1(s˜)
so that by Lemma 1
λ1(sˆ) > λ1(z) > λ1(s˜)
To construct the sunspot equilibrium consider an economy with the
three states s = sˆ, s˜, z. In this case the first-order conditions for asset
demand become:
λi(sˆ)pi(sˆ)|r(sˆ)|+ λi(s˜)pi(s˜)|r(s˜)| = λi(z)pi(z)|r(z)|, i = 1, 2.
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Now choose pi(z) < 1 sufficiently large (and accordingly pi(sˆ) > 0 and
pi(s˜) > 0 sufficiently small) such that
pi(sˆ)|r(sˆ)|+ pi(s˜)|r(s˜)| < pi(z)|r(z)|.
Note that ∂hi is any continuous, positive and decreasing function. Re-
call that, λ1(s˜) < λ1(z) and that v1(sˆ) is the smallest utility level in
the three states. Hence we can choose h1 such that λ1(sˆ) is sufficiently
large to solve the first order condition for i = 1. Analogously it follows
that λ2(sˆ) < λ2(z) and we can choose h2 such that λ2(s˜) is sufficiently
large to solve the first order condition for i = 2.
To complete the proof we follow the analogous steps as in Mas-Colell
(1992). Choose A ∈ IR3L×2 such that
r(s) = p(s) · (A1(s)− A2(s)) for s = s˜, sˆ, z. (1)
Finally, note that
∑
s
λ1(s)pi(s)p(s) · A1(s) =
∑
s
λ1(s)pi(s)p(s) · A2(s)
so that we can choose q1 = q2. Accordingly we choose θ
1 = (1,−1), θ2 =
(−1, 1) so that q · θi = 0, i = 1, 2 and θ1 + θ2 = 0. Since we have chosen
an economy with two assets, the first-order conditions for asset trade
are equivalent to the conditions
∑
s λ
i(s)pi(s)p(s)A(s) = γiq.
Case 2: If r(z) = 0 and r(s˜) = 0
then by the strong transfer paradox, even without trading any asset,
there is a competitive equilibrium in which sunspots matter.
Case 3: Finally, the case r(z) = 0 and r(s˜) < 0
is already covered by the reasoning of the first case if one changes the
point of view from agent 1 to agent 2.

Remark 2 Note that in the theorem above Part 1 has been shown for the
most general statement without evoking any particular assumption on the
asset structure A ∈ IRSL×J . Part 2 however is a stronger claim the more
the set of asset structures is restricted. The choice of the asset structure
matters in equation (1) of the proof. One way of restricting A is to only
consider numeraire assets so that all assets pay off in the same commodity.
Allowing for sunspot dependent assets this is a possible choice in the solution
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of equation (1). If assets are not allowed to depend on the sunspot states
then one can still find an asset structure solving equation (1), provided the
three price vectors p(s), s = s˜, sˆ, z are linearly independent. The latter then
requires to have at least 3 commodities.
Before passing to the next section we want to point out that the assump-
tions of additive separability is indeed tight. The inverse association between
the levels of marginal utilities and that of utilities, as shown in Lemma 1 does
not necessarily hold without additive separability. As the following example
shows without additive separability one can find that lower utilities are as-
sociated with lower marginal utilities. The endowments in this example are
supposed to be the ex-post endowments. Hence they are allowed to depend
on the sunspot states since the asset payoffs may depend on them.
Remark 3 Consider a two-agent economy with two commodities. The utility
functions are:
u1(x1) =
√
x11x
1
2 + x
1
2 and u
2(x2) =
√
x21x
2
2 + x
2
1.
Note that neither of the two utility functions is additively separable but both
are strictly monotonically increasing and strictly concave on IR2++ and both
satisfy the Inada-conditions. Moreover, note that both utility functions are
homogenous of degree one implying that both goods are normal. In situation
s = 1 the ex-post endowments are
ωˆ11(1) = 1, ωˆ
1
2(1) = 5 and ωˆ
2
1(1) = 4, ωˆ
2
2(1) = 2
There is a unique equilibrium3 with prices p(1) = (1, 0.7125). The equilibrium
budgets are:
b1(1) = 4.5623 and b2(1) = 5.4249.
The resulting allocation is:
x11(1) = 0.5380, x
1
2(1) = 5.6485 and x
2
1(1) = 4.4620, x
2
2(1) = 1.3515.
The utility levels are:
u1(1) = 7.3917 and u2(1) = 6.9177.
Marginal utilities within state 1,
(
∂bv
i(1) = v
i(1)
bi(1)
)
i=1,2.
, are:
3All values have been rounded to 4 decimal digits. The exact values can be found at
the page http://www.iew.unizh.ch/home/hens. Uniqueness can be seen from the graph of
the excess demand also shown on the webpage.
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∂bv
1(1) = 1.6202 and ∂bv
2(1) = 1.2752.
Now consider a second situation s = 2 with the same total endowments
but with a distribution of ex-post endowments as:
ωˆ11(2) = 5, ωˆ
1
2(2) = 5 and ωˆ
2
1(2) = 0, ωˆ
2
2(2) = 2.
Again, there is a unique equilibrium, now with prices p(2) = (1, 1.5113). The
equilibrium budgets are:
b1(2) = 12.5563 and b2(2) = 3.0225.
The resulting allocation is:
x11(2) = 2.3164, x
1
2(2) = 6.7758 and x
2
1(2) = 2.6836, x
2
2(2) = 0.2242.
The utility levels are:
u1(2) = 10.7375 and u2(2) = 3.4594.
Marginal utilities within state 2 are:
∂bv
1(2) = 0.8552 and ∂bv
2(2) = 1.1445.
Note that the second agent’s utility and his marginal utility has decreased
is passing from situation 1 to situation 2. Finally, note that we can find two
strictly concave functions hi such that the same ordering still holds for the
marginal utilities λi(s) = ∂vh
i(vi)∂bv
i(s).
Remark 4 With more than two agents the occurrence of the transfer paradox
still requires the existence of sunspot equilibria provided marginal utilities
are ordered inversely to utility levels. Even for additively separable utilities
this ordering property may however not hold with more than two agents.
Moreover, with more than two agents the strong transfer paradox is no longer
sufficient for the existence of sunspot equilibria. The simple reason is that
for agent 1 the strong transfer paradox may occur while the two other agents
will not find income transfers of opposite sign. The case of more than two
agents is analyzed in the discussion paper Hens, Pilgrim and Mayer (2004).
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4 Application
Having established the equivalence between the transfer paradox and the
sunspot paradox we now derive some new results on the existence of sunspot
equilibria and also on the possibility of the transfer paradox. Applying Tran-
noy (1986) we can rule out sunspot equilibria if for all spot market economies
that are induced by the wealth transfers there is a unique equilibrium. More-
over, applying Balasko (1978) we can rule out sunspot equilibria in the case
of two commodities if the economic fundamentals do have a unique equi-
librium. Finally, using the established equivalence we show that sunspot
equilibria need not be derived from multiple equilibria of the spot market
economy that is obtained by asset trade leading to the same endowment
distribution in all states.
The issue we want to clarify by these results is the relation of the existence
of sunspot equilibria and the uniqueness of spot market equilibria. This
question has also been addressed by Mas-Colell (1992) and Gottardi and Kajii
(1999), for example. The result in this section extends the results of Mas-
Colell (1992) to a stronger notion of uniqueness of spot market equilibria.
The result of Gottardi and Kajii (1999) is not applicable to our model because
it relies on first period consumption4.
For that purpose the following terminology is quite useful. Ever since
Cass and Shell (1983) it is now standard to say that sunspots matter if the
allocation of the competitive equilibrium depends on the sunspot states, in
which case the competitive equilibrium is called a sunspot equilibrium. In a
sunspot equilibrium sunspots matter because by strict concavity of the ex-
pected utility functions sunspot equilibria are not ex-ante Pareto-efficient. A
randomization equilibrium is a competitive equilibrium in which for some ex-
post endowments the equilibrium allocation in every state s is a spot market
allocation for the same economy. If, for example, the economic fundamen-
tals allow for multiple equilibria then there is a randomization equilibrium.
Mas-Colell (1992) has shown that with more than two comodities there can
also be randomization equilibria if there are multiple equilibria for some dis-
tribution of endowments that is attainable via asset trade. In both cases the
equilibrium allocation of such a competitive equilibrium is a randomization
among the set of equilibria of some underlying economy. In randomization
equilibria sunspots are a device to coordinate agents’ expectations. This
case of sunspot equilibria has found many applications. In the international
trade literature, for example, currency crises are modelled by randomization
4The technique used in Gottardi and Kajii (1999) is not easily applicable either because
they control the agents utility gradients both by perturbing the utility functions and by
changing the level of first-period consumption.
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sunspot equilibria. See, for example, the seminal papers by Obstfeld (1994)
and Obstfeld (1996) and also the interesting empirical papers on this issue
by Jeanne (1997) and Jeanne (2000)).
The question that arises from these observations is whether sunspot equi-
libria could be identified with randomization equilibria. This would then
make them very similar to publicly correlated equilibria known in the game
theoretic literature (Aumann (1974))5. Hence, the results of this literature
would then be applicable to sunspot equilibria.
It is obvious that in our setting with sun-independent assets, i.e. when
A(s) = A(1), s = 1, . . . , S, sunspot equilibria necessarily are randomization
equilibria. It is, however, not obvious at all whether with a general asset
structure there can also be sunspot equilibria which are different from ran-
domization equilibria. To clarify this point some more definitions are needed.
Definition 4 (Attainable Endowment Distributions) Given the econo-
mic fundamentals [(ui, ωi)i=1,2] and given the asset structure A the endow-
ment distributions ωˆi(s), s = 1, . . . , S, i = 1, 2 is attainable if there ex-
ists some competitive equilibrium with asset allocation (
∗
θ
i
),i=1,2, such that
ωˆi(s) = ωi + A(s)
∗
θ
i
, s = 1, . . . , S, i = 1, 2.
Based on the attainability concept we now define the uniqueness concept
suggested in Mas-Colell (1992). This condition has later been called no
potential multiplicity by Gottardi and Kajii (1999).
Definition 5 (Strong Uniqueness) The economy with the fundamentals
[(ui, ωi)i=1,2] satisfies the strong uniqueness property for some asset structure
A, if the spot market equilibria are unique for every attainable endowment
distribution.
Remark 5 In the model of this note markets are intrinsically complete, i.e.
Pareto-efficient allocations can be attained even without asset trade. With in-
trinsically incomplete markets sunspots are known to matter even if the eco-
nomic fundamentals satisfy the strong uniqueness property (cf. Cass (1989)
and the literature that has emerged from it, Guesnerie and Laffont (1988)
and Gottardi and Kajii (1999)).
In our setting with intrinsically complete markets we can derive the fol-
lowing results:
5See Forges and Peck (1995) for relating sunspot equilibria to correlated equilibria in
an overlapping generations model.
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Corollary 1 Under the maintained assumptions, sunspots do not matter if
the strong uniqueness property holds for all distributions of endowments in
the Edgeworth-Box.
Proof
Suppose sunspots do matter, then from our main result we know that the
transfer paradox needs to occur. However, as Trannoy (1986) has shown,
this requires to be able to trade to some distribution of endowments in the
Edgeworth-Box for which there are multiple equilibria, which is a violation
of the strong uniqueness property. 
Corollary 2 Under the maintained assumptions, in the case of two com-
modities sunspots do not matter if the economic fundamentals have a unique
equilibrium.
Proof
Suppose sunspots did matter then from our main result we know that the
transfer paradox needs to occur. However, as for example Balasko (1978)6
has shown, in the case of two commodities this requires to have multiple
equilibria for the initial distributions of endowments. 
¿From Corollary 2 we can see that in the case of two commodities and
sun-independent assets it is not possible to ”trade from uniqueness to mul-
tiplicity”. This is because with sun-independent assets sunspots can only
matter at distributions of endowments for which there are multiple equi-
libria. Hens (2000) has claimed that for an economy with two agents and
two commodities in which utility functions are concave transformations of
Cobb-Douglas utility functions sunspots matter. Corollary 2 shows that this
claim is incorrect. Moreover the mistake in Hens (2000) cannot be cured by
changing the values of the parameters for the same example7 because that
example falls into the broad class of economies which are covered by this
note. Indeed for Cobb-Douglas economies the equilibrium at the initial dis-
tribution of endowments is unique and the strong uniqueness requirement is
satisfied for almost all asset structures A.
Corollary 3 shows that as in the case of intrinsically incomplete markets
also with intrinsically complete markets sunspots can still matter even if they
do not serve as a coordination device among multiple equilibria.
6See also the solution to exercise 15.B.10C from Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green (1995)
that is given in Hara, Segal and Tadelis (1997).
7This possibility is left open by the observation of Barnett and Fisher (2002) who
demonstrate that for the specific parameter values chosen in Hens (2000) sunspots do not
matter! Moreover, in the example they suggest instead, sunspots do not matter because
agents are risk neutral.
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Corollary 3 Under the maintained assumptions, even for the case of two
commodities, there are sunspot equilibria which are not randomization equi-
libria.
Proof
The example we give to prove this corollary is adapted from the Example
15.B.2 in Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green (1995)8. There are two com-
modities and two agents with endowments [(ω11, ω
1
2), (ω
2
1, ω
2
2)] = [(2, r), (r, 2)].
Consumption sets are X i = {x ∈ IRL++|u
i(x) ≥ ui(ωi)} and utility functions
are given by
u1(x1) = x11 −
1
8
(x12)
−8 and u2(x2) = −
1
8
(x21)
−8 + x22.
Aggregate endowments are ω = (2 + r, 2 + r) where r = 2
8
9 − 2
1
9 ≈ 0.77.
Figure 1 shows the Edgeworth Box of this economy.9
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
sˆ
z
s˜
0
Figure 1: Edgeworth-Box
The convex curve is the set of Pareto-efficient allocations that lie in the
interior of the Edgeworth Box. It is given by the function x12 =
1
2+r−x1
1
. The
8See Hara, Segal and Tadelis (1997) for the solution to the original example.
9The Figures 1 and 2 have been generated with MATLABr. The scripts can be
downloaded from the page http://www.iew.unizh.ch/home/hens.
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competitive equilibrium allocations of our example will be constructed out of
these interior allocations. In Figure 1 we have also drawn some budget lines
indexed by s = sˆ, z, s˜, 0, supporting four different Pareto-efficient allocations
which are equilibrium allocations in the spot markets once appropriate spot
market endowments have been chosen. The sunspot equilibrium we con-
struct exploits the fact that in this example there are three equilibria for the
distribution of endowments [(ω11, ω
1
2), (ω
2
1, ω
2
2)] = [(2, r), (r, 2)]. Taking these
endowments as the reference point for the economy s = 0, we consider the
transfer of endowments as visualized in Figure 2. From the three equilibria
at [(2, r), (r, 2)] we have chosen the one with the highest first agent utility to
be the equilibrium allocation for the reference situation s = 0.
1.99 1.992 1.994 1.996 1.998 2 2.002 2.004 2.006 2.008 2.01
0.756
0.758
0.76
0.762
0.764
0.766
0.768
0.77
0.772
0.774
0.776
z
o
s˜
sˆ
Figure 2: Zoom of the rectangle in Figure 1
The asset structure A consists of numeraire assets denominated in the
second commodity. The vertical line in Figure 2 indicates the possible direc-
tion of endowment redistributions. With reference to s = 0, in the situation
z the first agent has received a transfer of the second commodity but his util-
ity decreases. In the situations sˆ, s˜ the first agent has donated some of the
second commodity and with reference to s = 0 his utility decreases. While
in sˆ it falls to the lowest of the four values, in s˜ it obtains a value between
the utility in s = 0 and s = z. Hence for these transfers the strong transfer
paradox occurs and by application of our main result there exists a sunspot
equilibrium with spot market endowments given by the intersection of the
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budget lines sˆ, z,and s˜ with the vertical line through the point (2, 0), while
the selected equilibrium in reference economy has the budget line 0.
Although this sunspot equilibrium lies in a neighborhood of a randomiza-
tion equilibrium it is itself not a randomization equilibrium because all spot
market endowments differ. 
This example exploits the multiplicity of equilibria of the economic funda-
mentals in the sense that in the neighborhood of the endowment distribution
leading to multiple equilibria the budget lines have various slopes that are
not ordered as the utility levels resulting in the ex post spot market equilibria
(see Figures 1 and 2). This property could however also occur with a unique
equilibrium for the economic fundamentals. Imagine for example that the
area in the rectangle of Figure 1 would lie outside the Edgeworth-Box. Then
keeping the line along which the transfers are defined inside the Edgeworth-
Box the same construction could be done. Unfortunately, we could however
give no simple utility functions as in Example 15.B.2 in Mas-Colell, Whin-
ston and Green (1995) which would lead to this feature. Hence, it remains a
conjecture whether there exist non-randomization sunspot equilibria even if
the economic fundamentals have a unique equilibrium10.
5 Conclusion
We have shown that for international economies with two countries in which
agents have additively separable utility functions the existence of sunspot
equilibria is equivalent to the occurrence of the transfer paradox. Based
on this result, we derived some new conditions for the occurrence of the
transfer paradox and also for the existence of sunspot equilibria. In par-
ticular we established some new insights on the relation of the existence of
sunspot equilibria and the multiplicity of equilibria. While the new results
are shown for frictionless two period economies with incomplete markets, ex-
ploring the connection between sunspot equilibria and the transfer paradox,
future research might also show interesting new results in related settings.
For example one could try to get new insights for the sunspot literature by
exploring the results on the transfer paradox in the overlapping generations
model (Galor and Polemarchakis (1987)). And similarly there might be new
results in storage analyzing economies with transaction costs respectively
tariffs (Lahiri and Raimondos (1995)).
10Note that in Mas-Colell (1992) it is not shown that for the initial distribution of
endowments the equilibrium is unique.
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